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Problem area 
Aviation security has become a key 
concern in the wake of the attacks 
of 11 September 2001. Subsequent 
investigations have highlighted the 
need to better equip flight deck and 
cabin personnel, since better 
security procedures and systems can 
help the crew prevent or handle 
better security incidents on-board.  
 
Description of work 
The Security of Aircraft in the 
Future European Environment 
(SAFEE) programme envisages 
constructing advanced aircraft 
security systems designed to assess 
on-board threats and to provide a 
response advice to the flight crew. 
The Threat Assessment and 
Response Management System 
(TARMS) is the first 
implementation of such a system. It 
will first gather threat information 
from onboard sensors and 
databases. Then, by using an 
onboard knowledge base, TARMS 
will assess the threat level and 
recommend a response to a detected 
threat. Expert knowledge gathered 
by multiple interviews with aviation 
security experts, pilots, cabin crew, 
and operators, forms the basis of the 
knowledge database.  
 
A key point for the successful 
construction of TARMS is an 
extensive validation and testing 
phase with the end-users in the 
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loop. In 2007 three periods with 
validation experiments took place in 
NLR’s Generic Reconfigurable 
Aircraft Cockpit Environment 
(GRACE) simulator. The 
experiments were based upon a 
number of experimental scenarios 
developed by consulting experts in 
airborne security operations. Over 
50 operational users (pilots and 
cabin crew) participated in the 
exercises.  
 
Results and conclusions 
TARMS, as a new system and 
concept, is the primary source of 
information regarding security 
threats onboard the aircraft. 
TARMS provides the crew with real 
time threat assessment and 
recommendation, and should be 
considered as a tool, assisting and 
advising the crew member.  
 
The experiment results neither 
prove nor disprove the hypothesis 
that TARMS enables the crew to 
make ‘better’ threat assessments. At 
most, the presence of TARMS 
raises the overall level of threat 
awareness. The feedback received 
provides support that TARMS 
suggests different courses of action 
to a given threat than crew do 
without the presence of TARMS.  
 
Applicability 
The main impression was that 
TARMS and the SAFEE concept 
are interesting and have great 
potential for enhancing the security 
onboard an aircraft. The majority of 
participants felt that there was value 
in having a security based system 
such as TARMS on board the 
aircraft. They felt that the strength 
of the system is in the detection of 
threat indicators rather than in their 
interpretation and decision making. 
However in its current state many 
participants had reservations about 
the value of having TARMS 
onboard and in particular about the 
response management aspect.  
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Summary 
A group of leading European companies and research institutes has joined forces in the 
innovative project SAFEE (Security of Aircraft in the Future European Environment) *1. The 
main goal is to ensure a fully secured flight from departure to arrival destination by construction 
of advanced aircraft security systems designed to respond to on-board threats.  
A key SAFEE system is the Threat Assessment and Response Management System (TARMS), 
which is envisaged as a decision-support system for the network of on-board actors. It will first 
gather threat information from on-board sensors and databases. Then, by using an on-board 
knowledge base, TARMS will assess the threat level and recommend a response to detected 
threats. Expert knowledge gathered by multiple interviews with aviation security experts, pilots, 
cabin crew, and operators, forms the basis of the knowledge database.  
A key point for the successful construction of TARMS is an extensive validation and testing 
phase with the end-users in the loop. In 2007 three periods with validation experiments took 
place in NLR's Generic Reconfigurable Aircraft Cockpit Environment (GRACE) simulator. The 
experiments were based upon a number of experimental scenarios developed by consulting 
experts in airborne security operations. Over 50 operational users (pilots and cabin crew) 
participated in the exercises. 
The experiment results show that the presence of TARMS raises the overall level of threat 
awareness. The feedback received provides support that TARMS suggests different courses of 
action to a given threat than crew do without the presence of TARMS. The main impression was 
that TARMS and the SAFEE concept are interesting and have great potential for enhancing the 
security on-board an aircraft. The majority of participants felt that there was value in having a 
security based system such as TARMS on board the aircraft. They felt that the strength of the 
system is in the detection of threat indicators rather than in their interpretation and decision 
making. However in its current state many participants had reservations about the value of 
having TARMS onboard and in particular about the response management aspect. 
 
                                                     
1 EU FP6 Aeronautics Project 
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1 Introduction 
When does a passenger become a security threat or a hijacker? What signs can be picked up to 
unmask a hijacker or terrorist? How can the flight and cabin crew anticipate a security event and 
stop it happening? How can the crew take measures before a threat is clearly identified and the 
terrorism act is already in progress? All these are burning questions since the 11th September 
attacks. In the wake of these attacks, air security has become a key concern for the aerospace 
industry. Subsequent investigations have highlighted the need to better equip flight deck and 
cabin personnel, and they have recognised that better security procedures and systems could 
have helped the crew to handle the situation better.  
A group of leading European companies and research institutes has joined forces in the 
innovative EU FP6 Aeronautics Project SAFEE (Security of Aircraft in the Future European 
Environment) [1], [2]. SAFEE envisages the construction of a set of innovative aircraft security 
systems that will make a significant contribution towards the assessment of on-board threats and 
the response to in-flight security events. These systems will improve the security level inside an 
aircraft by reducing the vulnerability, limiting the impact of hostile actions and enabling the 
aircraft to return safely to the ground. 
The assessment of the overall threat level to the aircraft at any given time requires the 
processing of large amounts of information. Clearly, the threat information received from on-
board sensors provides a major source of measured observations, but there are many other 
sources of information that contribute to the assessment, including intelligence information, 
passenger profiles, behaviour models and expected threat scenarios. There is therefore a 
requirement for an information processing system that can perform a threat assessment by 
fusing observations with knowledge models, and finally recommend the appropriate course of 
action. 
The innovation in SAFEE is to build a system able to cope with these requirements. This system 
must be capable of conducting a reliable assessment of a wide range of possible threats, utilising 
multi-source data. It will then use this information to generate a prioritised menu of courses of 
action for decision-makers, that are feasible, safe and conform to relevant governmental and 
airliners policies. 
The foreseen on-board system is the Threat Assessment and Response Management System 
(TARMS) which is envisaged as a decision-support system for the network of on-board actors. 
This system will gather information from on-board sensors, crew members and databases to 
determine the on-board threat level. 
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2 Defining requirements for TARMS  
As explained above, TARMS is at the core of the SAFEE system. Key issues to be addressed 
include understanding the functions it should perform and the constraints under which it must 
operate. In order to address these issues prior to embarking on the system design the preliminary 
task in the TARMS development was to define the system requirements. 
A four step process was adopted, based on proven techniques, each of which is supported by 
appropriate software tools (e.g. Objectiver) [3]: 
− Step 1: identification of right stakeholders and their interviews, extended with the security 
regulations currently in place. 
− Step 2: elicitation of end users’ needs, and transformation of needs into Use Cases (UC) of 
Unified Modeling Language (UML). 
− Step 3: merging of all the UCs into one large global UC, identification of conflicts, and 
transformation into the End Users’ Requirements Document  
− Step 4: derivation of the TARMS System Requirements Document. 
 
The steps of the process are summarised in Fig. 1.  
 
InterviewsSecurity regulations
Security Model
(Current System)
Threat Model
(on the Current System)
Security Mode
(Desired System)l
End users needs
Input from other groups
Requirements Model
For TARMS
TARMS SRD
 
Fig. 1. TARMS Requirements Process 
 
Requirements have been collected from different sources: 
• Interviews of a large set of stakeholders involved in the security of commercial flights: 
pilots, cabin crew, sky marshals, security managers, air traffic controllers, security 
authorities, and airlines. 
• Existing security regulations for air navigation from ICAO (International Civil Aviation 
Organisation) [4] and ECAC (European Civil Aviation Conference) [5]. 
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• Other security projects in progress (e.g. Eurocontrol ERRIDS project aimed at centralizing 
and despatching security information about flights at the European level). 
• The summary report on terrorist attacks upon the USA on the 11th of September 2001 [6]. 
The resulting System Requirements Document (SRD) produced from the requirements analysis 
process is compliant with the IEEE-830 standard. It contains a glossary of all specific terms 
used in the SRD (a by-product of the Objectiver Object Model), a top-down presentation of the 
goal graph motivating all the requirements and expectations, an inventory of all the 
responsibilities for each SAFEE sub-system, the conceptual model of the domain and the 
system (providing a first architecture of the system based on the problem at hand) and a 
definition of the interface between subsystems in terms of controlled and monitored objects. 
 
 
3 TARMS overview 
3.1 TARMS architecture 
A software framework has been developed for TARMS with three modules - the Threat 
Assessment Module (TAM), which will use the relationships between security input data to 
make useful inferences about potential threats, the Response Management Module (RMM) 
which will provide suggestions to users and may activate external actuator systems in order to 
mitigate the threat level of the flight, and the User Management Module (UMM) which will 
allow users to enter observation inputs and to interact with the decision support system [7].  
Fig. 2 presents the architectural decomposition of TARMS and clearly identifies three major 
modules. 
 
 
Fig. 2. TARMS high-level architectural design 
 
TARMS
Threat
Assessment
Module
Response
Management
Module
User Management Module
Aircraft Sensor
Systems       Pre DeterminedIndicators
Ground Based Agencies
Background and Context
Information
USERS
Pilots 
Cabin Crew 
Security Staff
Security
Inputs
ACTORS
Pilots 
Cabin Crew 
Security Staff
 Suggestions
and Actions
Aircraft Actuator 
Systems
Actions
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3.2 TARMS expert systems 
TARMS contains two expert systems within the TAM and the RMM. Both modules need to be 
able to assess information from a set of heterogeneous sources and to make inferences from that 
information – for threat assessment and response selection respectively.  
Expert systems can be constructed from training data, expert knowledge or a combination of 
both. In the air transport domain, there are very few examples of terrorist threat events, and even 
for those rare events, there is very little data recorded. That means there was no training data 
available. Therefore the expert systems were built entirely from expert knowledge, and this was 
achieved through a series of knowledge elicitation exercises. 
The knowledge elicitation process involves interviewing experts in the field of aviation security.  
The types of people interviewed included airline security managers, approved aviation security 
consultants, pilots, cabin crew, ground check-in staff and experts in explosives and nuclear, 
biological and chemical warfare.   
In the interests of keeping complexity to a minimum and progressing development quickly, it 
was decided to initially consider the four most likely and prevalent SAFEE threats as 
highlighted by the experts interviewed. These four threats were: 
• Take control of the aircraft and fly into a target (Hijack the aircraft for use as guided 
missile) 
• Hijack the aircraft to divert or negotiate (Hijack the aircraft to negotiate) 
• Blow up the aircraft with explosives onboard (Bomb) 
• Endanger occupants with aggressive behaviour  (Unruly Passenger)  
 
There are many ways of representing an expert system. For the TAM, we have selected 
Bayesian Nets (BN), while the proposal for the RMM is currently rule-based. BNs were chosen 
for threat assessment because they provide transparency both in knowledge capture (experts can 
understand how their knowledge has been encoded) and in application (the model provides an 
implicit explanation of its analysis of the situation).  
A BN is a probabilistic graphical model where the nodes of the graph are variables in the 
domain of interest. In the case of aircraft security, there are different types of nodes e.g. 
• Threat nodes such as ‘Hijack’, ‘Bomb’, etc.,  
• Evidence nodes that represent observations made of the passengers on the plane e.g. 
‘Suspicious Appearance’ and ‘Avoiding Crew Instructions’, and  
• Context nodes that represent information known before the flight e.g. ‘High Risk Flight’ 
and ‘Suspicious Ticket’.  
Graphical links (see Fig. 3) between the nodes represent a probabilistic relationship describing 
how one node influences another. An example is that a person with suspicious ticket purchasing 
behaviour is more likely to be a possible threat to the aircraft than a person with normal ticket 
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purchasing behaviour. Once created, these models will be used operationally by TARMS to 
predict how likely it is that any given passenger is a threat. The models will be triggered by 
passenger evidence data entered manually by the crew, or by automatic detections provided by 
an on-board sensor system.  
 
Fig. 3. Example of TARMS threat assessment knowledge base 
 
3.3 TARMS implementation 
The design of a software framework to support TARMS objectives has created a significant 
number of challenges. One important goal was not to restrict TARMS to interact with a specific 
set of external systems, i.e. it should be possible to interface TARMS with any external 
sensor/actuator system that complies with some basic requirements. This guided TARMS 
design to be as scalable and modular as possible. Another important goal was that TARMS 
should provide responses to threats in a timely fashion. The use of novel reasoning technologies 
in the TAM created some problems and uncertainty in the performance of such system. The 
possibility of distributing modules among different resources was the solution proposed to 
mitigate this problem. 
The use of JADE, a JAVA agent-based framework was adopted to cope with the 
aforementioned requirements. JADE provides a distributed environment where agents 
implementing components of the software can be deployed seamlessly across several computing 
platforms. Also, the addition of new sensors and user interfaces can be accomplished by adding 
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new agents to the system that support the specific interface with those external systems. JADE 
also provides agent communication protocols between agents using standard technologies, such 
as Ethernet protocols, providing TARMS the required modularity. 
 
3.3.1 Threat Assessment Module TAM 
The TAM aims to discover hidden relationships between different security input data received 
from onboard sensor systems, users and from ground intelligence agencies, and make useful 
inferences about potential threats arising from inside the aircraft. The approach to the design of 
the TAM is to use probabilistic models in the form of Bayesian graph networks. A probabilistic 
approach has a number of advantages: the model can be conditioned on evidence (i.e. 
observations), summarised predictions can be made and information can be predicted or 
removed from the model. 
These models would be used operationally by TARMS to predict how likely it is that any given 
passenger is a threat. They would be triggered by passenger evidence data entered manually by 
the crew, or by automatic detections provided by an on-board sensor system. Using the structure 
of the Bayesian network, and how one node influences another, the threat nodes and therefore 
the threat level can be inferred. If this threat level goes over a given threshold, then an alert is 
sent to the operator in charge – usually the pilot – and to the RMM.   
 
3.3.2 Response Management Module RMM 
The RMM is the component that allows TARMS to provide suggestions to users and to activate 
aircraft systems, in order to mitigate the threat level of the flight. The chosen methodology for 
the RMM was a rule-based system based on a simple security methodology.  The response 
model is a mapping from threats to responses. The model is populated based on the knowledge 
from domain experts. The system only processes one threat at a time, therefore the threats are 
prioritised. 
 
3.3.3 User Management Module UMM and User Interfaces  
The UMM is responsible for receiving observation inputs and providing suggestions of actions 
from/to the users of the system. Different users have different profiles, task loads and roles 
inside an aircraft and this must be taken into account when designing a user interface. The 
UMM must be capable of making the bridge between these different user interfaces and the 
other modules of TARMS.  
Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) were implemented for the cockpit crew and for the cabin 
crew. The cockpit crew was provided with an HMI on the electronic flight bag which gives 
them access to TARMS. The cabin crew HMI was provided on the central control panel in the 
cabin. In addition, a small wearable alerting device is suggested whose function is to alert 
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individual cabin crew members to take action. This device was not developed in the SAFEE 
project. The HMI was designed with three main principles in mind [7]. The system: 
• is a decision support tool 
• displays information to the user adapted to the situation  
• is a visual support to voice communication 
 
To provide visual support to the user instead of just providing raw data, the system displays a 
map of the cabin for the users to be able to assess where a reported threat is located. Users can 
report different types of situations: emergencies; unruly and suspicious passenger behaviour; or 
events. Fig. 4 shows an example of the TARMS HMI for the cockpit crew.  
 
 
Fig. 4: TARMS HMI 
 
Fig. 5: Briefing room for cabin crew during experiments 
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4 Validation exercises 
TARMS is a multi-user system for the assessment of threats and the generation of appropriate 
responses to these threats. A key point for a successful construction and user acceptation of 
TARMS is an extensive validation and testing process. Therefore TARMS and some supporting 
SAFEE systems were deployed in the Generic Research Aircraft Cockpit Environment 
(GRACE) simulator at NLR in Amsterdam, allowing the cockpit crew to interact with TARMS 
in a realistic situation. To allow the cabin crew to interact with TARMS a special room was 
prepared where a TARMS HMI was provided. A presentation of the events taking place in the 
cabin was displayed, while extra detail and explanations were given by a story teller (Fig. 5). 
The cabin crew had a headset and microphone to contact the cockpit crew while the cockpit was 
able to trigger a gong to signal the cabin crew to contact the cockpit.  
 
4.1 Validation aims 
The main objective of the validation process was to validate the operation of TARMS. 
Therefore the following validation aims have been established: 
1. Validation of the usefulness of TARMS in assessing threats 
2. Validation of the RMM in TARMS 
3. Validation of the TARMS HMI 
4. Assess the workload for the cockpit and cabin crew 
5. Validation of the SAFEE-TARMS concept 
 
4.2 Scenarios 
The scenarios are the story lines used to validate TARMS in various security situations. In a 
series of workshops a dedicated group of experts which consisted of aviation security 
specialists, terrorism consultants, flight crew, pilots, a sky marshal, psychologist, Red Team 
specialist, explosives expert and former intelligence agents, has developed a set of scenarios, 
based on realistic threats. This group was independent from the TARMS developers and the 
validation experts. The group’s objective was to make the scenarios as realistic as possible, 
relying on possible modes of hostile actions relevant information and appropriate security 
system and procedures. For the final check the scenarios were presented to GIGN (Groupe 
d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale), the French Gendarmerie's elite counter-terrorism 
and hostage rescue unit.  All the scenarios gained extensive approval from this unit. 
The scenarios include the pre-determined indicators (aggressive behaviour, substance detected, 
etc.) which would be detected by SAFEE systems and sensors, aircraft systems, and cabin crew 
as the scenario unfolds. Six scenarios have been developed in consideration of the TARMS 
validation (see Table 1). Five of these have been augmented with these indicators. The 6th 
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scenario (The Inside Job) is dealing with a threat that does not have any indicators during the 
flight. It was considered that this would not contribute to the validation trials and therefore was 
not used.  
 
Table 1: Validation scenarios 
 
4.3 Participants 
The participants in the validation trials consisted of three-person crews; a pilot, a co-pilot and 
one cabin crew member,  though in one experiment a crew with two cabin crew members was 
available. A total of twenty cockpit crew and ten cabin crew members were involved. All flight 
crew were active pilots on Airbus, Boeing or Fokker aircraft. The experience of the pilots varied 
from trainee pilot up to very experienced. The crew members worked for well-established 
European airlines from four different countries.  
All participants were trained in security issues, the SAFEE concept of operations, and  
the use of the TARMS and its HMI. This training was performed just before the validation 
trials. For the pilots there was also a simulator familiarisation run to become accustomed to the 
Airbus A330 simulator. Especially for the Boeing and Fokker pilots there was a briefing about 
the specific Airbus features in the cockpit.    
Each crew was present at NLR in Amsterdam for two days which included the training session 
and the validation trials. The half day training session covered; the SAFEE concept, the 
TARMS and a training run with TARMS in the GRACE simulator to enable each participant to 
have experience with the system prior to the validation trial. 
For the validation trial each crew was involved in the five different scenarios. The pilots were 
situated in the cockpit simulator and the cabin crew member in an adjacent room throughout 
each scenario.  
 
Scenario Description 
1 Dr No 
Hijacking attack in order to crash into target, using a medical diversion 
performed by “professionals”. 
2 Baby Boom 
A female suicide bomber smuggling innocent liquids in order to 
assemble them into explosives. 
3 
Take My Breath 
Away 
Chemical attack in multiple flights, simultaneously. 
4 Chain of Events 2 unruly passengers. 
5 With Bare Hands Group of unarmed, well-built hijackers 
6 The Inside Job Attack using help from an insider 
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4.4 Data gathering 
Each of the scenarios could be conducted with or without the use of TARMS and each crew 
completed one scenario without TARMS. Over the course of the trial all five scenarios were 
conducted at least once without TARMS. Each scenario was divided into blocks. At the end of 
each block the crew filled in a questionnaire detailing their assessment of the current threat 
situation on board, the suggested response, their interaction with the TARMS system and their 
communication with the other crew members. At the end of the experiments the crew filled in 
an electronic questionnaire dedicated to HMI issues. Finally the crew was debriefed in a 
classroom setting where they were able to give their final feedback and comments. During this 
debrief the workload issues where discussed as due to the lack of a cabin environment no 
realistic workload measurements could be taken.  
At the end of each experimental scenario the participants returned to the debrief room for a 
quick discussion about the scenario and received a briefing on the next scenario in the trial. 
After all five scenarios had been completed each participant filled in a separate questionnaire 
about the TARMS HMI. Each of the different types of questionnaires was designed to capture 
data to answer the questions corresponding to each questionnaire’s objectives. The two day 
trials finished with a final debrief session. 
 
 
5 Results 
First the results will be discussed for each of the data gathering methods. Then the overall 
experiment results will be described with respect to the validation aims. 
 
5.1 Scenario questionnaire 
The mean threat assessments made by the participants and by TARMS in the ‘With TARMS’ 
experimental condition for each of the potential threat situations were calculated. Fig. 6 shows 
as an example the mean threat assessments of ‘Unruly Passenger’ for the Dr No scenario. 
‘Unruly Passenger’ is a passenger who shows unruly or disruptive behaviour.  The ‘With 
TARMS’ condition was exposed to 14 pilots and 8 cabin crew, the ‘Without TARMS’ to 4 
pilots and 2 cabin crew. A threat assessment score of zero indicates that the participants thought 
that a threat was not at all likely, while a score close to 1 indicates a threat situation was 
believed to be highly likely. A visual inspection of the analysis of the Dr No Scenario results 
indicates that the presence of TARMS yields higher mean threat assessments across the majority 
of stop points when compared to the threat assessments made in the ‘Without TARMS’ 
condition. Over the course of the trial all five scenarios were conducted at least once without 
TARMS. 
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Fig. 6. Threat situation assessment at stop points in Dr No scenario 
 
5.2 HMI questionnaire 
The mean scores obtained on questions related to TARMS capabilities are presented in Fig. 7. 
TARMS capabilities speed, response time, reliability, failures and possibility of undo operations 
were rated higher than 3 on scale 1-6. Comments that were provided through the questionnaire 
were that the system could never replace the communication between cabin and cockpit and that 
a camera view of the cabin available in the cockpit would be a very useful addition to TARMS.  
Fig 7: Rating of TARMS capabilities 
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Especially the lack of ability to undo or cancel a threat was considered an important inflexibility 
of the system. Furthermore, it was mentioned that one could not rely on the system. And cabin 
crew reported that in emergency situations the system is too slow and it presents too much 
information. In general there will be little time to attend to the system. Some reporting items 
were mentioned to be missing: smoking in the toilet, disrespectful behaviour, and not listening 
to crewmember.  
 
5.3 Debrief session 
The majority of participants felt that there was value in having a security based system such as 
TARMS on board the aircraft, however many pilots have reservations about the response 
management aspect of TARMS. Some participants felt that it should be more of an awareness 
support system (not a decision support system) which provides information for a pre-assessment 
of a situation and triggers communication between the crew. During the trials it was indeed 
observed that the TARMS alerts often triggered communication between cockpit and cabin.  
Comments were made about the lack of contextual information associated with a threat alert and 
how this can affect the perception of a situation. 
Participants were also given the opportunity to comment on what aspects they would like to see 
in an improved TARMS. All pilots requested some visual information from the cabin, either in 
the form of cameras or a spy hole, however some felt that this may bias decision making 
especially if the situation in the cabin was particularly gruesome and upsetting. 
 
5.4 Overall experiment results 
The results of the experiments showed that for the aims described in section 4.1: 
• Aim 1: No evidence was found to support the hypothesis that posits that crew with TARMS 
can make ‘better’ threat assessments than crew without TARMS. Though one interesting 
result found was that crew provided a significantly higher threat assessment for the unruly 
passenger than any other threat! This is possibly due to crews seeing this threat much more 
often than the other threats. See Fig. 6 for an example of the threat assessment of an unruly 
passenger at the stop points in a scenario.  
• Aim 2: TARMS does suggest different courses of action to a threat than a crew does 
without TARMS, and while the participants agreed that most of the recommendations were 
sensible, the majority of participants commented on the need for these recommendations to 
be customised to airline company procedures. 
• Aim 3: The validation of the HMI showed that the majority of ratings provided by the 
participants were positive. The issues that were raised though focused mainly on the 
flexibility and alignment with airline company procedures. 
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• Aim 4: Feedback from participants showed some concern about the increased workload 
required to operate TARMS. It is believed though that increased training and the 
development of TARMS related policies and procedures would increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of TARMS and mitigate some of the workload concerns. 
• Aim 5: The main impression was that TARMS and the SAFEE concept are interesting and 
have great potential for enhancing the security on-board an aircraft. However, in its current 
state many participants had reservations about the value of having TARMS on board the 
aircraft, and in particular about the response management aspect of TARMS. Participants 
felt that the strength of the system is in the detection of indicators rather than in their 
interpretation and decision making. 
 
 
6 Conclusions and the way forward 
The conclusions from the trials have indicated that users are very interested in the concept of 
TARMS providing decision support to them in the early detection of possible airborne threat. 
One of the main problems the crew and current procedures have today is that they are all 
directed to react only after the threat was clearly identified, thus giving them a very short time to 
assess the situation and to counter it. TARMS gives them the opportunity to take actions to 
prevent the threat occurring. They felt that the strength of the system is in the detection of threat 
indicators rather than in their interpretation and recommendation of response actions.  Some 
participants felt that it should be more of an awareness support system (not a decision support 
system) which provides information for a pre-assessment of a situation and triggers 
communication between the crew.  
 
The trials elicited the users’ responses to different aspects of the system and this leads to the 
following recommendations:  
• Initiate a consultation with the user community to determine what form of decision-support 
system would now be required. This would include firstly assessing the benefits offered by 
the current TARMS functions, the collaborative working environment, and the expert-based 
threat assessment and response management. This should then lead to a more detailed 
specification of the information requirements, the collaborative decision-making processes 
and the user interfaces. One key recommendation is to create an additional facility to 
explain the reasons behind the advice provided on possible threats and appropriate 
responses. 
• Assuming the threat assessment is considered beneficial, perform a further analysis to 
identify the value of sources of expertise, and then develop advanced methods for eliciting 
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and representing this expert knowledge. This could include defining a common language to 
describe threats and responses with their consequences. Validation of the elicited 
knowledge will be a key step. 
• TARMS made various assumptions about provision of indicators from the on-board 
sensors. Although some important capabilities in automatic detection of some indicators are 
demonstrated [8], the majority of the required indicators remain difficult to detect 
automatically. An assessment needs to be made of which systems are likely to be developed 
to sufficient maturity in the next 5 years, and significant work should then be instigated to 
accelerate the development of these systems. For the remaining indicators, the alternative of 
humans providing the information should be investigated.   
• TARMS identified a number of interfaces to other SAFEE subsystems and demonstrated 
these as part of its trials programme [8]. A priority for any future integration project should 
be to define these interfaces in greater detail in the context of an overall system 
requirement.  
• Through a joint trial with the European Regional Renegade Information Dissemination 
System (ERRIDS) project, TARMS has demonstrated how its on-board system could 
collaborate with a ground-based system. It is our belief that any future project must 
consider the full integration of the on-board system within a system-wide information 
management network. Technology, architecture solutions, data and information models and 
rules of operation should all be investigated. This should all then be demonstrated and 
validated in a large crisis management exercise with the operational users in the loop. 
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